

#### LA-UR-19-20446

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Title: Global Security Overview

Author(s): Rosenberg, Nina Dale

Intended for: General presentation and welcome talks.

Issued: 2019-01-22





EST.1943





### **Global Security Overview**

Nina D. Rosenberg

Program Director, Nuclear Nonproliferation & Security

11 January 2019




## One Laboratory, One Mission: Strategic Deterrence



Los Alamos National Laboratory

through theory, modeling and simulation, and experimentation.

## In 1944, Los Alamos began a long history of intelligence missions to protect against nuclear threats





Major R. R. Furman

5/17/44

evaluated by someone not familiar with all the details. This we found out in the Cleveland tests is not of much use.

In view of this reasoning, and also because I have no idea to whom the cable is supposed to be dispatched, I do not feel able to make out a draft as you request. If I knew something of the background of the people who were to receive the cable, I would, of course, do my best in spite of my feeling that there is a far better way to obtain the desired results. But you make no reference as to the testing of the samples—who is to do it, and with what equipment. I would want to know that first, as I believe the water collection by "fishing parties", or the like, to be quite easy. In a cable, one can not give the information that could be pur across in a half hour of back and forth conversation. At least that much time would be required to give the man enough information so that he could do so that one could really have confidence in.

In view of the relative ease with which a competent man can be put on the spot with the proper instruments, I would hate to see the job done by untrained personnel who were just acting on orders from superiors.

Sincerely yours

LWA: he

Luis W. Alvarez

We saw in Cleveland how quite intelligent scientists, without experience in radioactivity, can go wrong in interpreting data from Counters. For that reason, if for no other, I would strongly urge that a competent man be sent over with equipment he really understands. He can then evaluate the experimental findings on the spot, and give a report which will mean something. If data alone is given by a man who is merely a technician, it will have to be interpreted and

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 4-87-019, 44-12 CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED PER DOC REVIEW JAN. 1973

made up an elaborate

We saw in Cleveland ence in radioactivit

For that reason, if petent man be sent o can then evaluate th a report which will

can be watched under a microscope to see how the Discharge Trited.

A-84-019, 44-12

Luis W. Alvarez INCLASSIFIED

## The Weapons Program and Global Security Programs develop strength through synergy, as GS develops new applications for Weapons expertise



## **Global Security Management Team**



**Laboratory Director** 

**Thom Mason** 



Deputy Laboratory Director, Weapons

**Robert Webster** 



Deputy Laboratory Director, Science, Technology, and Engineering

John Sarrao



**Deputy Laboratory Director, Operations** 

Kelly Beierschmitt



Associate Lab Director, Global Security

Nancy Jo Nicholas



**Director, Global Security Programs**FIE Director & Senior Intel Officer

Andy Erickson



**Chief Operating Officer** 

Evelyn Mullen

### Our Global Security organization has three technical divisions







## Divisions: Analytics, Intelligence, and Technology



We merge all-source intelligence on national security threats with cross-domain systems modeling, information synthesis, and communications tools to enable technology development and application in the national interest.



## **Divisions: Intelligence and Space Research**

We create, deliver, support and exploit innovative sensing systems for space-based, airborne, and ground-based applications to address critical national security and scientific challenges.




### **Divisions: Nuclear Engineering and Nonproliferation**

#### **Core capabilities:**

- Nuclear engineering
- Criticality safety research & experiments
- Nondestructive assay
- Reactor design & analysis
- Radiation detection/identification
- Radiation transport modeling
- ► Full life-cycle detector R&D




## Our Global Security organization has four program offices










## **Programs: Nuclear Security & Defense**

- Asymmetric Threats
- ▶ Warfighter encounters with WMD
- Space Defense

#### **Customer Focus**

- Department of Homeland Security
- Department of Defense








## **Programs: Intelligence and Emerging Threats**

- Counter new foreign technologies
- Predict or prevent catastrophic threats
- Improve technical security & surveillance measures

#### **Customer Focus**

- Intelligence Community
- Department of Homeland Security



## Programs: Nuclear Counterterrorism & Counterproliferation

- Nuclear Incident Response
- Foreign Nuclear Threat Reduction
- Nuclear Forensics

#### **Customer Focus**

- DOE/NNSA NA-80
- Defense Threat Reduction Agency
- Department of Defense







## **Programs: Nuclear Nonproliferation & Security**


- Detect and deter nuclear smuggling, proliferation, and detonations
- Secure and recover radiological material
- Strengthen nuclear arms control and treaty verification with international partners
- ► Train IAEA inspectors

#### **Customer Focus**

- NNSA/NA-20
- > State Department
- NASA



# The GS-NNS Program Office focuses on preventing nuclear proliferation and enhancing nuclear security



Deter and detect illicit movement of rad/nuc material


## Los Alamos trains and supports the IAEA





Los Alamos has pioneered a wide range of IAEA measurement tools in use today and continues to innovate with new technology









## Los Alamos works globally to improve nuclear security





We engage with international partners to build technical capabilities through training programs and workshops.



We work to limit the spread of sensitive materials and technologies through strategic trade controls.

### Off-site Source Recovery Program secures vulnerable materials



**Since 1997** 



37,000
Radioactive sealed sources have been removed



**OSRP BY THE NUMBERS** 







from over

1,300

industrial, educational, healthcare, and governmental facilities worldwide

## We support efforts to detect and deter nuclear smuggling

We provide support for radiation detection systems at borders, as well as test and evaluate new detection technologies



## Los Alamos works to reduce global HEU and Pu inventories

## **Conversion of research** reactors from HEU to LEU



Joint Japan-U.S.
experiments at NCERC
in support of return of
fuel from Japanese
Fast Critical Assembly




Mo-99 production without HEU



# ARIES supports disassembly of Pu components & their conversion to oxide for use in MOX fuel or dilution & disposal











## We develop new capabilities to detect, characterize, and monitor Special Nuclear Material production and weaponization activities




## Los Alamos develops and applies science and technology to benefit nuclear detonation detection missions





Space and Atmospheric Burst Reporting System (SABRS) Flight Unit 2 payload



Seismic propagation simulations



Source Physics Experiment

# Los Alamos laser for detecting nuclear material on Earth goes to Mars to determine habitability



- Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) was a Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project to look for material within gloveboxes at LANL's plutonium facility.
- A backpack LIBS unit has been developed for consideration by the IAEA.
- ► LIBS is the basis for the ChemCam laser unit on the current Mars Curiosity rover; the nextgeneration SuperCam instrument has been selected for the Mars 2020 mission, which endeavors to pave the way for human visitation to the Red Planet.

## **Questions?**

